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Introduction
In his polemic against revealed religion, Luciano Pellicani makes two 
fundamental claims that are historically and philosophically misguided. 
First, he asserts that the Puritans sought to establish a medieval collectivist 
theocracy, not a modern market democracy. Second, he maintains that the 
U.S. “culture war” between enlightened secular liberalism and reaction-
ary religious conservatism ultimately rests on the perpetual battle between 
Athenian reason and the faith of Jerusalem. Accordingly, Pellicani argues 
that America’s commitment to principles such as individual freedom, 
religious tolerance, or the constitutionally enshrined separation of Church 
from State represented Enlightenment emancipation from the constrict-
ing shackles of fanatical fundamentalism. Contrary to the zealous fervor 
of the Puritan Settlers, the Founding Fathers appealed to individualism, 
rationalism, and even atheism in their opposition to the tyranny of theistic 
revelation.
That is why—so Pellicani’s story goes—Paine, Jefferson, and Madison 
embraced “[d]eism [which], albeit presenting itself as the ‘natural reli-
gion,’ was nothing else but the philosophy of the Enlightenment, based on 
the primacy of reason and the principle of freedom.” Thus, the process of 
secularization grew out of “the cultural revolution of the Enlightenment—
a revolution that was a complete intellectual and moral revolution against 
the totalitarian dominion Christianity exercised over Westerners.” In short, 
both the U.S. constitution and its political history have revolved around 
the culture war between the theocratic absolutist order of faith preached 
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by the Puritans and the secular democratic order of reason promoted by 
the Founding Fathers.
In what follows, I shall contest Pellicani’s assertion that faith is 
opposed to reason and that America needs to eschew its Christian heritage 
in favor of Enlightenment secularism. My contention is that the modern 
sundering of belief from rationality underpins both secular rationalism and 
fanatical fideism. The only genuine alternative to these two extremes is 
not an attempt to repair the wreck that is the Enlightenment project but 
rather a proper synthesis of faith and reason that distinguishes political 
from religious authority without divorcing religion from politics. While 
mainstream Protestantism in the United States is characterized by a vague 
“civil religion” that is post-Christian and Gnostic in outlook, it is also the 
case that the rapprochement of Evangelicals and Catholics around shared 
notions of the common good has the potential to transform the American 
polity, economy, and society.
I. Protestantism and Secularization
Pellicani’s essay overstates the difference between the Puritan Settlers and 
the Founding Fathers. Both are part of a broad Protestant Evangelical tra-
dition that rejects not only “a central ecclesiastical authority” but also the 
overarching ecclesial and social unity of Christendom, which underpinned 
the constitutional, political, and socioeconomic organization of society 
across the West (including the Byzantine Commonwealth centered on 
Constantinople).1 As David Martin has shown, the Protestant schism led 
to three long waves of secularizing modernization,
beginning in the 1590s, accelerating from 1790 to 1850, and renewing 
the impulse again in the early 1900s. Very loosely these stages corre-
spond to a movement towards a lay, popular and enthusiastic Christianity, 
culminating in Pentecostal awakenings with a particularly powerful and 
influential eruption in Los Angeles in 1906. These awakenings were 
themselves harbingers of global society and their spread corresponded to 
the movement of lay people around the globe, to South Africa, Norway, 
Sicily, Korea or the Southern Cone of Latin America.2
1. Dmitry Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: eastern europe, 500–1453 
(London: Sphere Books, 1974).
2. David Martin, on secularization: Towards a Revised General Theory (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005), p. 27.
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As such, the origins and evolution of the Protestant Reformation contained 
the seeds of secularization in the sense of displacing Catholic and Orthodox 
Christianity in favor of new lay cultures. Initially these cultures detached 
religion from statehood, territoriality, and nationhood and also reduced 
clerical control over the laity. But they were subsequently co-opted by 
European princes and kings in the late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
“wars of religions,” which subordinated faith either to the central sover-
eign state or the divinely designated nation—or indeed both at once (as in 
the case of the United States and France).
Moreover, Protestantism’s nominalist denial of universals in real 
things and its voluntarist accentuation of God’s absolute divine power had 
the triple effect of inverting the primacy of good vis-à-vis evil, elevat-
ing the will over the intellect, and removing the sacramental mediation 
between the individual believer and God.3 Crucially, the Protestant tradi-
tion in general and its Puritan and Calvinist strands in particular linked 
divine predestination to messianic exceptionalism, which has governed 
both the U.S. social imaginary (the shining city on the hill) and its foreign 
policy narrative (the beacon of democracy to all the nations).4 In short, 
Pellicani’s distinction of Puritan theocracy and Deist democracy fails to 
recognize that both are part of the same secular logic, which replaces the 
mediated universalism of creedal Christianity with the unmediated faith in 
America’s Manifest Destiny. In this sense, Protestantism simultaneously 
secularizes religion and sacralizes politics.5
II. The Puritan-Calvinist Foundations of Capitalism
Like Protestantism, the genesis of capitalism is linked to the origins of 
modernity, to paraphrase Pellicani.6 He is certainly right not to equate 
the entire Protestant tradition with capitalism (as Weber did), but he is 
3. For a longer exposition of this argument, see Adrian Pabst, “The Politics of Para-
dox: Metaphysics beyond ‘Political Ontology,’” Telos 162 (Winter 2012): 99–119.
4. Michael Northcott, An Angel directs the storm: Apocalyptic Religion and Ameri-
can empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004); William Pfaff, The irony of manifest destiny: The 
Tragedy of American Foreign Policy (New York: Walker and Company, 2010).
5. Protestant secularism is compatible with the Evangelical awakening throughout 
the “long nineteenth century” (ca. 1800–1950) that coincided with a period of wholesale 
modernization, setting the United States firmly on the path of global hegemony. See Jon 
Butler, Awash in a sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1990); Michael Young, Bearing Witness against sin: The evangelical Birth of 
the American social movement (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006).
6. Luciano Pellicani, The Genesis of Capitalism and the origins of modernity, trans. 
James G. Colbert (New York: Telos Press, 1994).
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surely wrong to associate Puritanism with an economic settlement that 
was collectivist and feudal. On the contrary, most American Puritans and 
Calvinists sanctified the pursuit of state-sponsored market interest, as 
R. H. Tawney argued.7 Indeed, both the Settlers and the Founding Fathers 
embraced in different ways the myth that free-market capitalism—under 
the aegis of a strong central state—really is a divinely instituted economy 
of salvation. Accordingly the hidden hand is indeed the hand of providence 
that generally rewards the provident. As such, America’s God is neither a 
personal Trinitarian Creator nor a remote moral deity but instead a provi-
dential force that directly recompenses hard work and business success. 
In his influential book The social sources of denominationalism, Richard 
Niebuhr makes the important point that Puritanism and Calvinism provide 
the link between American capitalism and liberalism: there is a “harmony 
of the Calvinist conception of individual rights and responsibilities with 
the interests of the middle class” and “Laissez-faire and the spirit of politi-
cal liberalism have flourished most in countries where the influence of 
Calvinism was greatest.”8
Arguably, this strand can be traced to late sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Calvinists and Puritans who built the new world of the Atlantic 
North.9 Numerous Puritan leaders, such as John Cotton, Cotton Mather, 
and Solomon Stoddard, or American theologians like Jonathan Edwards 
reinterpreted Christ’s passion as a necessary precondition for the restora-
tion of cosmic political and economic justice after the Fall, which takes 
the form of a liberal polity and a free market—a vision that culminates 
in the foundation of America’s “commercial republic.”10 Thus, the New 
Jerusalem inaugurated
an economy of atonement and imputed righteousness; an abstract ledger 
of relationship to God in place of an older mimesis of the inner divine 
7. R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, rev. ed. and intro. Adam B. 
Seligman (1926; New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), pp. 79–132.
8. H. Richard Niebuhr, The social sources of denominationalism, repr. (New York: 
Holt, 1957), pp. 94–95. Cf. William E. Connolly, Capitalism and Christianity, American 
style (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008), pp. 17–68.
9. See, inter alia, Menna Prestwich, ed., international Calvinism, 1541–1715 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); Mark Valeri, “Religion and the Culture of the Market in Early 
New England,” in Peter W. Williams, ed., Perspectives on American Religion and Culture 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 92–104.
10. Mark A. Noll, America’s God: From Jonathan edwards to Abraham Lincoln 
(New York: Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 227–367.
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life. The relationship of imputation to actual status is indeed a kind of 
religious equivalent of representationalist epistemology: salvific status 
refers to real outcomes, while the latter only have value in terms of sal-
vific status. Thereby one has a totality of mutual reference yet without 
any intrinsic relation or participation, such that this referring paradoxi-
cally allows the two poles to develop in independence of each other: 
you can still get saved in the most materially reduced and debauched 
circumstances imaginable.11
By preaching a gospel of prosperity and conflating the elect with the 
wealthy, Puritans and Calvinists distorted traditional Christianity and 
aligned Protestantism with a political-economic liberalism that has 
licensed the pursuit of power and pleasure.12
Since unbridled capitalism is remorselessly atomistic and commodifies 
all human relationships, the nihilistic amorality and criminal corruption of 
hedonism has led both Puritans and their neoconservative contemporaries 
to call for more market freedom in order to bring about salvation and at 
the same time more state authoritarianism in order to police the ensuing 
social-cultural anarchy.13 Worse, the practice of Evangelical religion has 
itself become increasingly capitalized: the saving of souls is synonymous 
with the making of profit, and the church is a marketplace wherein souls 
are traded as commodities. Thus, the human person is a free-trading agent 
and a commodified subject all at once. In this sense Protestantism really is 
like market capitalism, not feudal collectivism.
III. The Post-Christian Outlook of America’s “Civil Religion”
Pellicani’s focus on the opposition between Puritan theocracy and Deist 
democracy seems to blind him to the unifying role of America’s “civil 
religion.”14 The country’s vague “religiosity” is largely governed by a 
11. John Milbank, Beyond secular order. Faith, Reason, Geopolitics (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), p. 350.
12. Thomas Frank, one market under God. extreme Capitalism, market Populism, 
and the end of economic democracy (New York: Random House, 2000).
13. Thomas Frank, What’s the matter with Kansas: how neoconservatives Won the 
heart of America (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
14. I have argued this in greater detail elsewhere. See Adrian Pabst, “The Western 
Paradox: Why the United States is more religious but less Christian than Europe,” in 
Lucian Leustean, ed., Representing Religion in the european union: does God matter? 
(London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 168–84.
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post-Christian, Gnostic spirituality that bears increasingly little resem-
blance to creedal Christianity.15 Instead of universal Christian festivals 
that continue to regulate public life in Europe (even in the secular French 
Republic), the U.S. polity is structured by specifically American holidays. 
Paradoxically, America’s more strongly privatized public sphere opens 
up a space for a more explicitly politicized and moralized creed that is 
more fundamental than the rivalry between traditionalist-conservative 
and progressive-liberal values fuelling the “culture wars.” Crucially, 
America’s civil religion feeds on the Manichean moralism taught in many 
mainstream churches in order to reinforce a sense of national exceptional-
ism that pervades U.S. politics. The constant appeal since independence 
to notions such as New Jerusalem, coupled with the promotion of global 
market democracy as America’s mission for the world, reveals a form of 
modern messianism that nonetheless has roots in medieval millenarian-
ism. From a more traditional Christian perspective, this vision is secular 
and heretical all at once because to clothe “market-state” power with the 
spiritual authority of salvation implies that national self-aggrandizement is 
necessary to secure God’s providential plan.
At its most extreme, this has produced a kind of neo-colonial capital-
ism that eschews personal perfectibility and social improvement (which 
were key priorities for an earlier tradition of both liberal and neo-orthodox 
American Protestants) in favor of geoeconomic and geopolitical expan-
sion. The anarchy of national states and transnational markets is seen as 
the mark of a sinful, fallen world, which is subject to the providential law 
of “market-state” governance. The violent struggle of the originally elect 
nation Israel to hold on to its promised land and the similarly violent strug-
gle of the divinely designated America to fulfill its messianic mission are 
interpreted as signs of the end times. This fusion of primary promise with 
ultimate apocalypse underscores the non-Trinitarian and non-incarnational 
outlook of U.S. Protestantism, which underpins America’s semi-Gnostic 
“civil religion” and also appeals to many members of other world faiths. 
All of which helps account for the tendency of many U.S. Catholics, Jews, 
and other religious believers to become more like Protestants.
15. Will Herbert, Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An essay in American Religious sociol-
ogy, rev. ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1960); Thomas Luckmann, The invisible Religion: 
The Problem of Religion in modern society (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Harold Bloom, 
The American Religion (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Nancy Ammerman, Congre-
gation and Community (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1997).
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However, strong Catholic immigration from Central and Latin 
America might change this in future. Likewise, here are clear indications 
that the progressive tradition of evangelicals is currently undergoing a 
significant revival. Large sections of North American evangelicals have 
sought to transform modern secular politics and economics. Until the First 
World War and again during the civil rights movement of the late 1950s 
and the 1960s, they were in fact politically progressive. As Marcia Pally 
has shown, Evangelicalism was anti-elitist, anti-authoritarian, economi-
cally egalitarian (against corporate banking and wealthy landlords), and 
socially interventionist on behalf of the common good—running social 
programs for the poor, vastly expanding popular institutions like the U.S. 
postal service, and providing some of the earliest critique of laissez-faire 
capitalism.16 This all changed in the 1960s when, partly in response to 
the Democratic Party’s growing secular agenda, both Evangelicals and 
Catholics embraced the New Right and formed a coalition with the Repub-
licans.17 In this process, they endorsed the sort of “small government” 
politics first promised by Ronald Reagan and nowadays championed by 
the Tea Party movement.
Currently the United States is witnessing a rapprochement between 
Evangelicals and Catholics that attempts to re-orient the American Dream 
away from right-wing market-driven materialism (or the social-democrat 
alternative of statist welfare) toward greater self-organization of com-
munities and the associative ties of intermediary institutions. Connected 
with this is the argument that civil society is neither synonymous with 
commercial exchange nor the same as purely voluntary action but instead 
represents a more primary realm that is ultimately upheld by the Church. 
This vision is advanced by a new generation of influential Evangelicals 
like Jim Wallis and David Platt, whose work resonates strongly with Cath-
olic social teaching and cognate traditions in the Episcopalian Church.18 
16. Marcia Pally, The “new evangelicals”: expanding the Vision of the Common 
Good (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2011).
17. Mark Stricherz, Why the democrats are Blue: secular Liberalism and the decline 
of the People’s Party (New York: Encounter Books, 2007).
18. Jim Wallis, God’s Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left doesn’t 
Get it (New York: HarperCollins, 2005). As a community organizer who was trained in 
the tradition pioneered by Saul Alinsky, the young Barack Obama worked with local com-
munities and different faith groups to help regenerate Chicago’s most deprived inner-city 
area—a “people’s politics” that differs markedly from the collusion of “big government” 
and “big business” since Nixon. As president, Obama had the opportunity to draw on the 
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This, in turn, suggests that Protestant secularization is neither unilinear 
nor irreversible but itself a dialectical process that oscillates between a 
dominant secularism, which is positively correlated with modernization, 
on the one hand, and a more traditional orthodox faith, which challenges 
the secular orientation of modernity, on the other hand.19
IV. “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”
Pellicani’s assertion that supernatural faith is opposed to natural reason 
is just as misguided as the claim that only the Enlightenment can save us 
from religious fundamentalism. Curiously the logic of Pellicani’s position 
is all too Protestant in its dualistic divorce of rationality from belief. For it 
was the Reformation’s separation of natural immanence and supernatural 
transcendence that sundered faith from reason and accordingly impover-
ished both. The former was either “positivized” as an inner impulse or 
“transcendentalized” as a blind, irrational creed. Likewise, the latter was 
either enthroned as the sole transcendental absolute or reduced to the 
positivist rationality of calculus and scientific experimentation. Instead of 
securing their respective specificity and integrity, this secular conception 
pitted belief and reasoning against one another. The ensuing opposition 
between fideism and rationalism fueled the clash of religious fundamental-
ism and secular fanaticism that has characterized politics and international 
relations for much of the nineteen, the twentieth, and the early twenty-first 
centuries.20
Without each other’s import, both belief and rationality can be dis-
torted and instrumentalized at the service of market individualism or state 
collectivism—or a sinister fusion of both at once. As Pope Benedict XVI 
has argued, “distortions of religion arise when insufficient attention is 
given to the purifying and structuring role of reason within religion”; 
new rapprochement between Catholics and Evangelicals in order to advance an agenda 
that is both economically egalitarian and socially transformative. At the time of writing, 
however, this vision remains wholly unrealized.
19. See Adrian Pabst, “The Paradox of Faith: Religion beyond Secularization and 
Desecularization,” in Craig Calhoun and Georgi M. Derlugian, eds., The deepening Cri-
sis: Governance Challenges after neoliberalism (New York: NYU Press/SSRC, 2011), 
pp. 157–82.
20. See, inter alia, Mark Juergensmeyer, The new Cold War? Religious nationalism 
Confronts the secular state (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1993); Benjamin Barber, 
Jihad vs. mcWorld (New York: Times Book, 1995); John Gray, Al-Qaeda or What it means 
to Be modern (London: Faber, 2003).
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likewise, “without the corrective supplied by religion, though, reason 
too can fall prey to distortions, as when it is manipulated by ideology, or 
applied in a partial way that fails to take full account of the dignity of the 
human person.”21 Just as rationality acts as a controlling organ that binds 
belief to cognition, so too faith can save reason from being manipulated 
by ideology or applied in a partial way that ignores the complexity of the 
real world. Without each other’s corrective role, distortions and patholo-
gies arise in both religion and politics. For instance, fanatical believers 
use faith as a vehicle of hatred and seek to refashion the whole world in 
their own puritanical image. Likewise, the totalitarian ideologies of the 
twentieth century were variously more pagan or more atheist, and they 
legitimated genocide and total warfare in the name of an exceptionalism 
that was expressed in the language of secularist messianism. The impact 
of globalization risks exacerbating existing extremes and marginalizing a 
mediating middle that blends reason with faith.
Ultimately this clash of extremes is the result of de-hellenizing Christi-
anity and other religions such as Judaism and Islam. Hellenization marked 
the creative encounter and transformative synthesis of Greco-Roman 
reason with the faith of Jerusalem. Hellenized Judaism sought to univer-
salize the Jewish faith beyond ethnicity and territoriality by building on 
the prophecy of Isaiah (chapters 40–66) that speaks of a new creation, 
which has been interpreted as prefiguring the coming of Christ. Here it is 
instructive to invoke the work of Philo of Alexandria (20 BC–50 AD) who 
was a contemporary of Jesus and argued for an allegorical interpretation of 
Scripture that drew on ancient mythology and philosophy—an experience 
that foreshadowed the “inculturation” of Christianity in pagan societies.22 
Both Jesus himself and the Apostles were rooted in the Hellenic tradi-
tion of Judaism, as were the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists who 
viewed Greek and Roman thought as preparatio evangelica. Later, the 
21. Pope Benedict XVI, Meeting with the Representatives of British Society, 
Westminster Hall, September 17, 2010, available online at the Vatican website, http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2010/september/documents/
hf_ben-xvi_spe_20100917_societa-civile_en.html.
22. Martin Hengel, Juden, Griechen und Barbaren: Aspekte der hellenisierung des 
Judentums in vorchristlicher Zeit (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1976); trans. Jews, 
Greeks and Barbarians: Aspects of the hellenization of Judaism in the Pre-Christian 
Period, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Martin Hengel, The ‘helleniza-
tion’ of Judea in the First Century after Christ, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Trinity, 
1989).
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Neo-Platonist Church Fathers and Doctors integrated both Hellenized 
Judaism and the Greco-Roman tradition into Christianity. They developed 
a symbiotic relation: just as Christian theology fulfills ancient philosophy, 
so too ancient philosophy assists Christian “faith seeking understand-
ing”—exploring the paradox of Christ’s full divinity and full humanity 
and making the unknowable mystery of the Incarnation and the Resurrec-
tion rationally intelligible.23
Of course Pellicani is right to suggest that the conflict between Athens’ 
“culture of reason” and Jerusalem’s “culture of faith” is an aspect of West-
ern intellectual history—a well-known thesis for which he cites in support 
an essay by Leo Strauss on the diametric opposition between rational phi-
losophy and religious prophecy.24 It is true that Hellenized Judaism and 
Hellenic Christianity had many critics. For example, among the Jewish 
people there were those like the Maccabees and the Zealots who opposed 
any rapprochement with Hellenism. Likewise, among Christians there 
were those like Tatian (ca. 110–180) and Tertullian (ca. 160–220) who 
equated ancient philosophy with unbelief and heresy: “What has Athens to 
do with Jerusalem?” Tertullian asked provocatively. “Wretched Aristotle,” 
he proclaimed, “God has spoken to us: it is no longer necessary for us to 
philosophize. Revelation is all that is required. He who merely believes 
in the word of God knows more than the greatest philosophers have ever 
known concerning the only matter of vital importance.”25 However, it is 
precisely the separation of theology from philosophy that underpins the 
de-hellenization of Christianity and has fostered the clash between the 
rationalism of secular extremism and the fideism of fanatical faith. Here 
23. The Christianized (Neo-)Platonism of Church Fathers such as Justin, Clement, 
Origen, Gregory, and Augustine did not simply correct the philosophical and theological 
errors of Plato (the pre-existence of chaotic matter; the creation of formal order out of 
material chaos, etc.) and Plotinus (equating matter with absolute evil; the tension between 
the absolute unity of the One and the plurality of its products; the relation between the One 
and the metaphysical hierarchy of the world, etc.). Much rather, Christian (Neo-)Platonists 
modified ancient philosophy precisely in order to develop a Trinitarian theology of creation 
and incarnation. See Adrian Pabst, metaphysics: The Creation of hierarchy (Grand Rap-
ids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2012), pp. 54–151.
24. Leo Strauss, “Jerusalem and Athens: Some Introductory Reflections,” Commen-
tary 43 (June 1967): 45–57.
25. Tertullian, “De praescriptio haereticorum,” in The Ante-nicene Fathers, vol. 3, 
Latin Christianity, ed. A. Robertson, J. Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (1885; New 
York: Cosimo, 2007), p. 246 (translation modified).
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Pope Benedict’s Regensburg address—in which he calls on all religions 
to integrate faith with reason in new ways such that the world’s religious 
cultures can once more rationally debate their universal beliefs—is far 
more significant for America and the rest of the West than Leo Strauss’s 
rather drab dualism of the philosopher versus the prophet.26
Indeed, the encounter of Greco-Roman philosophy with biblical rev-
elation was not a matter of chance but responded to a common concern 
with the dual meaning of Logos as both ratio and verbum. The helleniza-
tion of both Judaism and Christianity produced a unique synthesis of faith 
and reason that is the mark of the West. Then as now, the living tradition 
of catholic-orthodox Christianity provides the conceptual resources for 
a synthesis that binds together rationality and belief in a mutually cor-
rective and augmenting manner. Faith can reinforce trust in the human 
capacity for both reasoning and understanding and also trust in the rea-
sonableness of reality. Similarly, “secular” rationality can help religious 
belief make sense of its claims and give coherence to its intuitions. 
Crucially, reason and faith can assist each other’s search for objective 
principles and norms that govern personal and political action. What links 
rationality to belief is the shared commitment to universal standards of 
truth beyond mere logical coherence and empirical validity. As such, 
the relationality of reason and faith is not merely a concern for religions 
but can provide the glue that holds together the polity, the economy, and 
society.
By expanding the scope of rational cognition, belief allied to rational-
ity celebrates the “grandeur of reason” (Pope Benedict XVI). Accordingly, 
the re-hellenization of Christianity and other world religions would 
promote the proper cognitive import of belief. This suggests that faith 
precedes and exceeds reason, in the sense of a pre-rational trust in the 
reasonableness of the world that can direct rationality beyond a purely 
formal, instrumental focus and open it to the possibility of shared ends, 
which can unite members within and across different polities. Crucially, 
faith does not necessarily impose a set of dogmatic truths on reason, which 
would warrant accusations of religious fundamentalism. On the contrary, 
both faith and reason share a commitment to the quest for truth—faithfully 
and reasonably.
26. Pope Benedict XVI, The Regensburg Lecture, trans. James V. Schall S.J. (Chi-
cago: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).
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V. Concluding Remarks: Politics beyond Enlightenment Secularism
Tocqueville noted that America is at once the freest country in world 
and the society where there is least of all public debate and most of all 
tyranny of mass opinion. Over time this has perpetuated the myth of 
messianic exceptionalism that pervades U.S. politics beyond both the par-
tisan divide and the “culture war” opposing secular liberals to religious 
conservatives—a tacit consensus that engenders social conformism and 
a lack of fundamental political choice. By either reducing the common 
good to individual rights or bracketing the good altogether out of the pic-
ture, Enlightenment liberalism is unable to stop the seeming inexorable 
evolution toward authoritarian democracy and even democratic tyranny. 
To uphold a genuinely plural universalism requires standards of truth and 
goodness that can order conflicting values such as freedom, equality, or 
security. 
Instead of abandoning its Christian heritage in favor of secularism, the 
United States—like the rest of the West—would do well to renew the uni-
versal promise of Christianity. Based on the Jewish vision of prophets who 
call kings to righteousness, the Christian Church embodies the free space 
between the individual person and the collective state. As the “corporation 
of corporations,” the Church promotes the autonomy of mediating bodies 
such as monastic orders, parishes, universities, hospitals, guilds, and all 
kinds of other intermediary institutions that constitute the realm of civil 
society. 
This realm is more primary than either the central state or the free 
market because it is the space in which individuals and groups form a 
common civic culture and social bonds that are more fundamental than 
either formal constitutional-legal rights or economic-contractual ties. The 
emphasis on participation, reciprocity, and mutuality is connected with 
a more relational account (in terms of objective—not subjective—rights 
and reciprocal duties) that outflanks the dialectic of the individual and the 
collective, which has been dominant since the American and the French 
Revolution. 
By upholding the freedom of all from sovereign coercion, the Church 
universalizes the ancient idea of free association around shared ends such 
as the common good and the good life. Even if there are rival visions and 
contested versions, these and other finalities cannot be reduced to indi-
vidual rights or entitlements without violating the dignity of the human 
person because individual rights are collectively defined and centrally 
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policed. The distinctly Christian heritage of balancing individual with 
group rights provides the basis for an “organically” plural universalism 
that differs from the sinister fusion of moral relativism with political abso-
lutism, which threatens America and the rest of the West. 
The shared Christian legacy in East and West rests on the blending of 
the principle of free association in Germanic law with the Latin sense of 
equity and participation in the civitas—a unique heritage that gave rise 
to the notion of constitutional rule and good government (as depicted 
by Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s famous fresco Buon Governo in the Palazzo 
Pubblico of Siena). All this has the potential to transform America’s 
authoritarian “market-state” into a genuinely liberal polity and market 
economy. For example, Americans could renew their own best traditions of 
constitutional rule, a subsidiary federalism that devolves power to the state 
and municipal levels as well as plural modes of free association, which lie 
at the heart of its town-hall democracy and market economy. Instead of 
national exceptionalism, the United States can once again appeal to the 
principles and practices of embodied universalism that have made it one 
among many great Christian nations.
